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# THE WHITE HOUSE

#### WASHINGTON

# January 10, 1995

## PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-50

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD DIRECTOR OF THE PEACE CORPS

Subject: Emergency Humanitarian Relief

Enormous, sudden-onset refugee migrations, devastating wars of ethnic hatred, and complex humanitarian problems (e.g., drought in the Horn of Africa) are severely testing the ability of the international community to maintain stability, save lives, and reduce suffering.

The flight of Iraq's Kurds to Turkey, movement of Rwanda's Hutus to Zaire, and the horror inflicted on civilians by war in Bosnia and Somalia are stretching existing capabilities to respond both unilaterally and multilaterally.

The emergency relief system relies on ad hoc responses by international organizations, NGOs, and civilian government agencies. The fallback capability has been the use of the military, particularly that of the United States.

Shortcomings of the current international system include its slowness to respond, weak coordination and poor internal communications among relief operations, limited large-scale logistics capabilities, inequitable burden of financing, and reliance, <u>in extremis</u>, upon the U.S. military. In addition, too little attention is paid to: efforts to avert, early warning of, and quick response requirements to, sudden and massive humanitarian emergencies.

These deficiencies require an interagency review of U.S. and international capabilities and the mechanisms for pre-empting the need for emergency relief, as well as initiating and delivering international emergency relief, with a view toward creating a more responsive, effective and equitable system.

#### The Study

This PRD will examine the problem on a priority basis, identify issues and options and make recommendations to the Deputies Committee in thirty days. The study will build on and coordinate with the efforts of present interagency working groups (IWGs) dealing with PRD 46 (Refugees and Migration) and implementation of PDD 25 ("humanitarian annex" to the Peacekeeping PDD).

The study should specifically address issues identified below, with the lead responding agency indicated in parenthesis:

- The Problems: What are the estimates of large-scale humanitarian disasters likely to occur over the next several years? What are their general causes? Where are they likely to occur? What has been the pattern of the last decade? Is it likely to continue? (CIA)
- The Current International Response System and International Organizations: How are existing international crisis response mechanisms (private and governmental, domestic and international) structured? What are their predictive and pre-emptive capabilities? How do they generate resources and how can that ability be improved? What are their strengths and weaknesses and what changes should be considered? What proposals exist for improving the international crisis response capacity, and what are their strengths and weaknesses (specific analysis of the "white helmets" initiative, UN Humanitarian Assistance Team (UNHAT) proposal, and the work of the Carnegie Endowment should be included)?

How can the international community better intervene before situations become conflicts/crises? What changes should we seek in UN organizations and, in particular, the DHA? How can we ensure improved coordination between the military, political and humanitarian components of international humanitarian interventions? What are the views and ideas of other governments, international organizations, NGOs and other commentators? What role can private civilian contractors play in addressing international humanitarian crises? (State)

- <u>U.S. Organization</u>: How does the U.S. system (private, NGOs and governmental) work? What are the shortcomings of USG organization for these issues in general and in the peacekeeping context in particular? What is the state of early warning efforts in the USG and how can coordination be improved? How is USG knowledge currently shared and improved to increase the preparedness of other countries to anticipate and respond to disasters? In this respect, what role might FEMA, the Peace Corps, the intelligence community and other agencies play? Evaluate proposals for modification in USG organization. (AID)
- Effect on the U.S. Military: What sorts of capabilities are the U.S. military called on to provide in these disasters? What is the current and potential future cost of U.S. military support and what effect does that have on U.S. military readiness? How could the U.S. military reorganize to better accomplish the mission of humanitarian assistance? Could some of those capabilities be replicated in civilian organizations and, if so, how? (DOD)
- <u>Budgetary Considerations</u>: How can the U.S. improve its ability to budget for such international humanitarian crises? What options exist for new budgetary mechanisms within the DOD and State budgets, outside these budgets? How can the U.S. ensure adequate resources for the military costs associated with U.S. support in crisis situations without significantly degrading readiness? (OMB)
- Options for Improvement: The PRD should propose and examine means of enhancing both USG and international response capability. The PRD should address whether there are packages of USG and international improvements that make sense as options. The options presented should be evaluated against a uniform list of criteria, including financial cost. (NSC)

### Organization

Each of the six topics (above) will be reviewed by an interagency sub-group chaired by the agency designated. The sub-groups will report to a steering group. The steering group, chaired by the Administrator, AID, should complete the review process by February 24th. The steering group chair and NSC staff will then prepare options for review by the Deputies and Principals Committees.

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